[Jhorlin] MoD - The middle man?

Day 1,084, 06:03 Published in United Kingdom United Kingdom by Jhorlin

This article is written in response to the huge storm of poo that is currently surrounding the resignation of Artela, who has been a great Chief of the General Staff for six weeks now. I find it important to emphasise that these deliberations are designed as a compromise (and in my eyes is not the ideal situation of a wholly separate military).

On Accountability

I start by taking issue about the use of the word "accountability" which is thrown around like poo from a monkey when talking about the CGS. The CGS, as head of the military, is accountable for all things going on in the military. Currently, quite rightfully so, they are difficult to remove however. I think this is the main issue.

For example, recently while Artela was head of the military, 4000G worth of military assets were lost. Artela, as head, was responsible (or accountable) for the loss. Yet it was not Artela's fault, nor necessarily a fault of the system. Somebody who was trusted and had worked through command, proven their trustworthiness suddenly went rogue. This could happen to any previous CGS, including myself, including jamesw, or in any government body. She was unlucky to have it happen to her, but she did nothing wrong (indeed the military reaction to the event was commendable). Accordingly she was accountable, but no action ought to be taken.



If, hypothetically, a CGS did steal all of the military assets for themselves, then that accountability would give rise to a reaction by the CP, one would imagine it would be the removal of that CGS. This would not be questioned by any party, because there is an obvious abuse of responsibility on the part of the CGS. However, if a CP wanted to remove a CGS because they had differing political views, this would be very difficult to justify, and doing so would be political suicide for the CP. This is the ideal system of CGS accountability and removal, because it ensures that a CGS can't be switched around like ministers at an election (and we've all seen how partisan that can be!).

It is based on this concept that I have designed an alternative model; one in which a political MoD could operate.

The Model

I offer the idea that between a fully military CGS and a fully political CP, a fully political MoD is placed. The CGS is the head of the military and acts as an advisor to both the MoD and the CP on military affairs. They are also responsible for the implementation of changes requested by the MoD or CP. The MoD applies government policy to the military, whether that be a policy on communes or orders, and issues policy to the CGS to implement. This allows a government to have a political influence on the operation of the military without disrupting it. A clear chain of command exists, where the CGS is subservient to the CP (which is delegated through the MoD).



The MoD

This position will likely rotate each month as the other ministers do, and will likely warrant applications just as other ministries do.

The key is to get this balance right. The MoD oughtn't have access to any command forum or channel, and dealings should be exlusively with the CGS (or the General Staff if the CGS chooses to delegate).

The MoD would also have to avoid meddling with certain affairs (eg promotions etc.) that are exclusive to the military as an organisation.

The CGS

This position would only be slightly different as now. They would likely have cabinet IRC access, simply so that they are able to quickly react to wars, but would not need forum Cabinet access and would otherwise not be a Minister. All reporting should be done directly to the CP or to the MoD.

The CGS runs the entire military, overseeing the various Branches as they do now, and having unfettered command over them. The only curb to autonomy is that they institute MoD requested policy.



The CGS, as now, would be designed to change as rarely as possible, and free from the CP elections and ministers. The aim would be to keep a military man (or woman) at the head of the military, who would speak on behalf of the military.

The Non-Implementation Directive

This is the difficult bit. In making it difficult to remove a CGS, it might be difficult to remove one who is simply ignoring the MoD and the CP. Harder still to remove one who is only half-heartedly applying MoD policy.

The other difficulty about creating an enforceable non-implementation directive is that it is difficult to do without opening up the position of CGS to political interference. Accordingly, I would suggest that a "3 strikes" system.

1. The MoD creates a public post, that the CGS is required to sign off on, to say that the MoD is not happy that policy is being applied. The CGS then has 48 hours to apply it.

2. Upon failing to apply policy (or take all reasonable steps to apply it) after stage 1, supermajority in congress is required to vote that MoD policy has not been applied and that the CGS has not taken all reasonable steps to apply it. The CGS then has 48 hours to apply it.

3. Upon failing to apply policy (or take all reasonable steps to apply it) after stage 2, the CP will remove the CGS for failure to apply the policy. This is rebuttable by a supermajority in congress voting that the CGS has taken all reasonable steps, however, this vote must be completed within 48 hours to be valid, otherwise a new CGS is appointed by the military.

I welcome additional thoughts and input, but would love to see this model implemented over a pure MoD.

Regards,



Jhorlin
Former Chief of the General Staff